

19 July 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

  
Office of DD/I


SUBJECT:

NSC 170/1

1. The OCB at its meeting of June 16th requested the OCB Working Group, which is dealing with NSC 170/1 (Korea) to review the current validity of that paper in terms of recent developments at Geneva. The Working Group has made such a review, and has prepared a document on the subject, a copy of which is attached. Both in the summary on the first page of the document, and in the body of the main paper there are a variety of conclusions which I believe should be looked at by ONE since they are in the nature of estimates of future action by the ROK.

2. Will you ask the ONE people to look at this paper and to let me have their comments back by Thursday, if possible?

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Special Assistant to the Director

Attachment:

TS 95501-A, copy 6 and  
TS 95501 copy 6.

NSC review(s) completed.

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
Washington 25, D. C.

July 16, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD ASSISTANTS

SUBJECT: Review of NSC 170/1 (Korea)

The attached report is transmitted for the information of the Board in accordance with the Board's request at its June 16th meeting (Agenda Item 3, Report Item 30).

  
George A. Morgan  
Acting Executive Officer

Attachment:

Working Group Chairman's Memo,  
Subject as above, dated 7/15/54,  
with attachment as listed.

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

July 15, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OCB:

SUBJECT: Review of NSC 170/1 (Korea)

1. In accordance with the request of the Operations Coordinating Board at its meeting of June 16, the Working Group on NSC 170/1 (Korea) has reviewed the current validity of this policy statement in terms of recent developments at Geneva. It is considered that a progress report to the OCB is not necessary.

2. The Working Group concludes:

a. That events at Geneva have not affected the validity of NSC 170/1, including paragraph 6, Annex A (cf. NSC Action 1087-b);

b. That efforts be continued to eliminate the MNSC and that the provisions of the Armistice Agreement restricting the introduction of materiel be reviewed by the Working Group with a view to seeking some means of relief from such restrictions, since Communist non-observance of these provisions places the UNC at a disadvantage.

c. That there is no evidence of significant change in the intention of either the ROK or the Communists to renew hostilities in Korea.

3. The Working Group notes that the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the recommendations of General Hull and the report and recommendations of General Van Fleet (cf. NSC Action 1092) will be relevant to implementation of NSC 170/1.

4. A more detailed summary is attached.

*Robert J. G. McClurkin*  
Robert J. G. McClurkin  
Chairman, OCB Working Group on  
NSC 170/1 (Korea)

Attachment:

Review of the Validity, Progress in Implementation of,  
and Actions to be Taken with Respect to NSC 170/1 -  
dtd 7/15/54

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July 15, 1954

REVIEW OF THE VALIDITY, PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND ACTIONS

TO BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO NSC 170/1

1. Validity of NSC 170/1 as Policy Guidance

The Working Group on Korea has reviewed NSC 170/1 in the light of the failure of the Geneva Conference and of the current situation. The Working Group believes that NSC 170/1 in general continues to provide valid guidance. The following elements of the paper, however, should be specially noted.

a. Paragraph 6, Annex A

There has been no change to warrant modification of NSC Action 1087-b, which reaffirmed the validity of Annex A and provided for continuous review by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Armistice Agreement

NSC 170/1 states that the U.S. should "continue to observe the Armistice" (paragraph 5a), and should "seek to ensure that the ROK observe the Armistice . . ." (paragraph 5b). CINCUNC believes that he should be relieved of certain provisions of the Armistice which adversely affect the security of the forces under his command because he observes them but the Communists do not. These provisions are paragraph 13d, Section A, Article II, which relates to the introduction of reinforcing materiel, and Section C, Article II, which sets up the NNSC. The other elements in the Armistice Agreement appear tolerable and the Armistice itself should be retained.

With respect to the restrictions on replenishing materiel, the Working Group on Korea should be directed to review the problem both from the standpoint of military necessity and urgency and from the standpoint of political desirability of the alternative methods it is possible to employ to relieve ourselves of the restrictions.

With respect to the NNSC, informal discussions have already been held with the Swiss and Swedes, and it appears likely that they will voluntarily withdraw, thus rendering the Commission inoperative. Czech and Polish team members could then be ousted from the ROK. If the Swiss and Swedes do not voluntarily withdraw in the immediate future, further efforts will be made to persuade them.

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c. Retention in Korea of the Armed Forces of other UN Members

Paragraph 10c relates to the stationing of armed forces of other UN members in Korea and directs a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from them. NSC Action 1087-c agreed that implementation of this paragraph should not be pressed at that time. The U.K. has already indicated its desire to reduce its contingent in Korea by about 1/2 in order to reinforce Malaya. The U. K. was informed at Geneva that the U.S. probably would not object to such action but the Department of Defense, however, opposes such action and has communicated its objections to Department of State.

2. Implementation of NSC 170/1

The following paragraphs describe action taken in implementing U.S. policy with respect to Korea and suggest further actions to be taken:

a. U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)

Paragraph 10a of NSC 170/1 states that the U.S. should ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK. This has been done. Exchange of ratifications to bring the Treaty into effect was scheduled for May 26, 1954. The ROK declined to exchange ratifications because they wish to amend the Treaty in two respects: (1) addition of an "aggressor" clause which would commit the U.S. to support the ROK in military action to drive the Chinese out of North Korea; and (2) a termination clause similar to that contained in the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan which would require the mutual consent of both parties before the Treaty could be terminated. President Rhee has been informed by Ambassador Briggs that the U.S. cannot accede to either of these proposed amendments. The initiative for exchanging ratifications and bringing the Treaty into effect thus lies with the ROK, and there is no reason for the U.S. to press the ROK on this matter.

b. Build-up of ROK Forces

Paragraph 9a(3) and 10b provide for sufficient ROK armed forces for internal security and defense short of a major power's attack and the development of ROK security within the Armistice terms, respectively.

NSC Action 1092 approved the despatch of General Van Fleet to the Far East, and to Korea in particular, for the purpose of assessing our military programs in the area. He is reviewing the size and composition of the ROK forces, and, in concert with General Hull, will make recommendations. No action should be taken on this subject

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prior to review of the Van Fleet-Hull recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and subsequent action by the NSC.

c. Redeployment of U.S. Forces

NSC Action 1087-d noted that the Secretary of Defense was deferring all further redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea until after June 1, 1954. This question is now being reexamined by State and Defense in the light of the present situation in the Far East.

d. NSC Action 1004-a

The outcome of the Geneva Conference has not affected the validity of the decision contained in this action.

e. Turning Over to the ROK Administrative Control North of the 38th Parallel

Both Ambassador Briggs and CINCUNC have recently recommended that the UNC turn over to the ROK administrative control of the area north of the 38th parallel now controlled by the UNC. Action is in process to effect the turnover.

f. Special Problems with the ROK as a Result of the Failure of Geneva Conference

(1) U.S.-ROK Consultations: In their joint statement of August 8, 1953, Secretary Dulles and President Rhee agreed to consult in the event of a failure of the Korean Political Conference. President Rhee is considering an invitation to come to Washington for these consultations.

From the U.S. point of view, and probably that of ROK as well, consultations should await review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and decisions on the recommendations of the Van Fleet Mission.

(2) Unilateral Military Action: Failure of the Conference at Geneva raised again the possibility that the ROK may undertake unilateral action to unify Korea (paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of NSC 170/1). CINCUNC has detailed plans for action in the event of this contingency, which appear to be adequate. However, it is presently unlikely that the ROK will take unilateral military action, particularly in the light of President Rhee's hope that current reconsideration of ROK force levels will result in

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a decision by the U.S. to increase or strengthen the ROK forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken the review of this problem and of CINCUNC's plans in light of the post-Geneva situation and other developments.

(3) Withdrawal of ROK Forces from the UNC:

It is doubtful that President Rhee will actually withdraw command of the ROK forces from the UNC unless he initiates unilateral military action or is convinced that there is no basis for continued U.S.-ROK cooperation. If he should withdraw his forces from UNC control without initiating hostilities, CINCUNC will take action to redeploy U.S. and other UN forces to rear areas. In addition, CINCUNC may wish to inform the ROK that he has authority to support and assist ROK forces only so long as they are under his command.

3. Conclusions

- a. That events at Geneva have not affected the validity of NSC 170/1, including paragraph 6, Annex A (cf. NSC Action 1087-b);
- b. That efforts be continued to eliminate the NNSC and that the provisions of the Armistice Agreement restricting the introduction of materiel be reviewed by the Working Group with a view to seeking some means of relief from such restrictions, since Communist non-observance of these provisions places the UNC at a disadvantage.
- c. That there is no evidence of significant change in the intention of either the ROK or the Communists to renew hostilities in Korea.

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